

**НАЦИОНАЛНА СИГУРНОСТ  
NATIONAL SECURITY**

**DEFICIENCIES IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF EUROPEAN  
NATO MEMBER STATES AT THE END OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup>  
AND THE BEGINNING OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

**Plamen Bogdanov, Ralitsa Yotova, Steliana Yordanova**  
*University of Library Studies and Information Technologies*

**Abstract:** *The article explores the evolution of the European Union's plans to build key military capabilities to enable the Union to independently and effectively conduct future multinational operations. The analysis of the series of initiatives, plans and concepts shows that the existing shortfalls have not been addressed yet, and there are still serious deficiencies in the military capabilities of the European Union.*

**Keywords:** *capabilities, deficiencies, interoperability, concept, initiatives*

**INTRODUCTION**

In the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were two major multinational operations – Desert Storm in 1991, in the region of the Persian Gulf and Allied Force in 1999, in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

These operations, and the second one in particular, have shown certain disbalances between the capabilities of the armed forces of the USA and those of their European Allies, namely in the spheres of precision strikes, mobility and command, direction and communication. For this reason, a Defence Capabilities Initiative was approved in 1999 by the Heads of State and Government of NATO member states. The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and between Alliance and Partner forces where applicable. It is important that all nations are able to make a fair contribution to the full spectrum of Alliance missions regardless of differences in national defence structures.

It was taken into account that significant progress has been made in recent years in adapting Alliance forces capabilities to the requirements of the new security environment. However, it was concluded that many Allies have only relatively limited capabilities for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside their national territory, or for extended sustainment of operations and protection of forces far from home bases. Command and control and information systems need to be better matched to the requirements of future Alliance military operations. Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

## **THE AMBITIOUS INITIATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

In conjunction with the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the ambitions of the European Union have also been expanded.

At the European Council meeting in Cologne (3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> June 1999), Member States' Heads of State or Government declared their resolve “that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. (...) The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. (European, 1999)

The Helsinki European Council (10–11 December 1999) underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.

In the field of military capabilities which will complement the other instruments available to the Union, at the Council the Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons) capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (Petersberg tasks, 1992). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support units and, as required, air and naval elements. In Helsinki, the Member States also decided rapidly to develop collective capability goals, particularly in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. (Helsinki, 1999) This was a military target known as the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003.

At the Helsinki European Council, the Member States also decided rapidly to identify the collective capability goals in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, and welcomed decisions of that nature already announced by certain Member States:

- to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
- to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
- to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
- to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
- to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.

It remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the European security and defence policy that the European Union's military capabilities for crisis management be reinforced so that the EU is in a position to intervene with or without recourse to NATO assets.

The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched at the end of 2001 to rectify identified shortcomings in the Helsinki Headline Goal. By rationalising Member States' respective defence efforts and increasing synergy between national and multinational projects, the plan was intended to enhance European military capability.

Following the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003, the EU decided to set a new Headline Goal 2010<sup>1</sup>. Building on the Headline Goal 2003, it envisages that the

Member States will “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union”.

The process of developing EU military capabilities towards the Headline Goal of 2010 is a thorough one. The first step was to identify strategic planning assumptions. Five illustrative scenarios, encompassing a wide range of military operations, were prepared.

From these scenarios, focused military options were developed for how best to deal with the relevant crises. These options led to a planning framework from which was derived a detailed list of the capabilities that the EU would need. Generic force packages were compiled, which identified the type of force groupings that the EU would require to solve the crises.

These in turn resulted in a list of reference units. All this information was fed into a Requirements Catalogue, which detailed the actual types of units, resources and assets that were required in order to deal with the scenarios envisaged.

After coordination process an EU Force Catalogue was compiled, which describes, in qualitative and quantitative terms, the military capabilities the Member States could make available to the EU. The Force Catalogue details military capabilities available by 2010. (Development, 2009)

In May 2004, with a view to the EU’s ambitions on rapid response, the Council recognised in particular the need to achieve further progress in improving capabilities for strategic mobility. Strategic transport is one of the key enablers for the EU Battlegroups. In this context the Headline Goal 2010 mentions the following milestone: “the implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic joint lift coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations”.

The Headline Goal 2010, adopted in May 2004, recognises that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed.

The newly established European Defence Agency (EDA) was planned to play a crucial role in this improved framework for capability development. Its mission is to assist Member States’ efforts to improve their military capabilities to sustain ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future.

On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2004 in Brussels, the Member States took part in a Military Capability Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki European Council. The conference also made it possible to identify a number of areas in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action.

This conference constituted the first stage of a demanding process of reinforcing military capabilities for crisis management by the EU with the purpose being to achieve the overall goal set by 2003 but continuing beyond that date in order to achieve the collective capability goals. Member States declared their determination to implement the objectives of the Headline Goal 2010, including the creation of EU Battlegroups (as part of Rapid Response elements), providing the European Union with the Initial Operational Capability in 2005 and with commitments on the Full Operational Capability from 2007 onwards. The Member States were determined to develop further criteria and standards, building on the overarching standards and criteria for Battlegroups. The Ministers of Defence also agreed on the Global Approach on Deployability. This initiative aimed

at more effective use of available assets, mechanisms and initiatives for strategic transport, a key enabler for Rapid Response.

The Single Progress Report of November 2004 summarises and assesses the progress of the European Capability Action Plan and identifies the work that remains to be done to rectify the remaining military shortfalls under the Helsinki Headline Goal.

The EU Force Catalogue underwent a first revision in February 2007 which led to a second revision of the Force Catalogue in October 2007, followed by the Force Catalogue 2009 noted by the Council in May 2009.

Meantime, on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007, the EU achieved full operational capability to conduct two concurrent rapid response operations of the size of a Battlegroup (BG) of around 1,500 men. Since then, Member States have managed collectively to make permanently available to the EU two BGs (1,500 up to 2,500 personnel). BGs are a specific form of Rapid Response elements. They remain on standby for six months and can be ready to start implementing their mission within 10 days after the Council's decision to launch the operation and for a maximum of four months.

Also, earlier work on examining the contribution that naval and air forces can make to ESDP rapid response operations resulted in the adoption by the EUMC in late 2007 of a Maritime Rapid Response Concept and an Air Rapid Response Concept, followed by the revised Military Rapid Response Concept agreed by the EUMC in January 2009. It newly defines the military rapid response time as a period from 5 to 30 days from the approval of the Crisis Management Concept to the moment when operations commence in the Joint Operations Area. (Development, 2009)

The Progress Catalogue, together with the EU Military Committee's subsequent work on prioritising the shortfalls, is a key contribution to the Capability Development Plan (CDP) drawn up by the Member States via the EDA and the EUMC in July 2008.

The EDA Steering Board initiated work on an initial group of twelve capability areas out of the twenty-four identified in the initial CDP:

- Measures to counter man-portable air defence systems;
- Computer network operations;
- Mine counter-measures in littoral sea areas;
- Comprehensive approach – military implications;
- Military human intelligence and cultural/language training;
- Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance architecture;
- Medical support;
- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
- Third party logistic support;
- Measures to counter improvised explosive devices;
- Increased availability of helicopters;
- Network-enabled capability (NEC).

With so many defined priority deficits in the military capabilities of the EU, by the end of 2008, the evaluation of the EU Heads of State and Governments was overly optimistic. They endorsed an analysis of the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy. The report of

this analysis said that “Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this” (Report, 2008). Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battle groups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus”. (Report, 2008)

For military missions in the report was written that the EU must continue to strengthen its efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so. (Report, 2008)

Building on the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security Policy put forward in June 2016, in November 2016 an Implementation Plan was presented focusing on Security and Defence to raise the level of ambition of the European Union’s security and defence policy.

The actions needed to fulfil the new level of ambition are built around the three strategic priorities derived from the Global Strategy:

- Responding to external conflicts and crises when they arise;
- Building the capacities of partners;
- Protecting the European Union and its citizens through external action.

Some of the main actions under implementation are:

- Deepening defence cooperation;
- Permanent Structured Cooperation;
- Rapid Response;
- Planning and conduct of missions;
- Taking forward CSDP partnerships.

The EU Treaties foresee the possibility of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) through which Member States that are willing and able can enter into more binding commitments with one another and jointly develop defence capabilities, invest in shared projects, or create multinational formations.

On 11<sup>th</sup> December 2017, the Council formally established PESCO following a joint notification signed by 25 Member States in which they have undertaken a set of 20 more binding commitments between one another. At this occasion, the Member States participating in PESCO also identified on 6<sup>th</sup> March 2018 a first set of 17 collaborative projects which will be undertaken in different groupings.

This Treaty-based framework and process will be a drive for closer cooperation in development of defence capabilities, based for the first time on binding commitments undertaken by each Member State deciding to participate. The implementation of PESCO focuses on Member States fulfilling their commitments and putting in place the annual process foreseen to assess this, as well as taking forward the PESCO projects. This will help to enhance the efficiency and output of European defence and to implement the EU level of ambition.

The Council adopted the second set of 17 projects on 20<sup>th</sup> November 2018.

During the Council meeting in Brussels (11–12 November 2019) an updated list of 13 projects was adopted to be undertaken under PESCO. The decision amounts to 47 projects. (Outcome, 2019)

The 2018 Capability Development Plan (CDP) was of particular strategic significance as it serves as a baseline and reference for the implementation of major European defence initiatives launched following the 2016 EU Global Strategy: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) called for “strengthening the CDP” and “assisting Member States to develop capabilities stemming from the political goals of this strategy”.

The most tangible output of the 2018 CDP revision are the 11 new EU Capability Development Priorities, developed together with Member States. They are the result of an in-depth assessment conducted on the basis of contributions provided by Member States, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) on short-term, mid-term and long term trends: capability shortfalls analyses and lessons learned from recent CSDP operations; planned capabilities and the potential for future European cooperation in each of the capability domains; and a study into the long-term capability-related and technological trends and needs (2035 and beyond).

The 2018 CDP and the derived EU Capability Development Priorities were approved by Member States on 28<sup>th</sup> June 2018.

The 11 new 2018 EU Capability Development Priorities include:

- Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operation;
- Ground combat capabilities;
- Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea;
- Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector;
- Space-based information and communication services;
- Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities;
- Air superiority;
- Cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition;
- Information superiority;

- Naval manoeuvrability;
- Air mobility.

During the meeting in November 2019 the Council approved the EU Requirements Catalogue 2019, which identifies the military capability requirements for CSDP and takes into account the three strategic priorities set out under the EU Global Strategy.

In July 2019 the consolidated version of the “Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU” was issued, which was accessible to the public on 29<sup>th</sup> January 2020. The aim of the document was to provide initial military requirements to improve movement of military forces (personnel, materiel and assets) within and beyond the EU. Military mobility is a strategic and operational enabler for military action, supporting the EU strategic autonomy and facilitating the deployment, redeployment and sustainment of EU Member States forces to meet the EU Military Level of Ambition, in accordance with the Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy, as well as national requirements. (Military, 2019)

### **LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN EU MILITARY CAPABILITIES**

At the Summit on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2021, NATO Leaders endorsed the NATO 2030 agenda. The basis was the Secretary General’s proposals to make NATO stronger and ready for the future.

The Summit came at a pivotal moment for the Alliance, as NATO adapts to growing global competition and more unpredictable threats, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, and Russia and China’s challenges to the rules-based international order. Standing strong together to face a more unpredictable and competitive world is what the NATO 2030 initiative is about.

The Secretary General developed 9 concrete proposals, which include inter alia Improved Resilience, Preserve NATO Technological Edge, the Next Strategic Concept.

In the framework of the proposal named Preserve our Technological Edge, allies agreed to launch a new civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). This Accelerator will boost transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies, promote interoperability and harness civilian innovation by engaging with academia and the private sector, including start-ups. DIANA will include offices and test centres across the Alliance, and it will manage a database of trusted sources of investment. Allies also agreed to establish a multinationally funded NATO Innovation Fund, to which Allies can contribute on an opt-in basis, investments in start-ups working on dual-use and emerging and disruptive technologies in areas that are critical to Allied security.

Emerging technologies are changing the nature of peace, crisis, and conflict. NATO Allies can no longer take their technological edge for granted. China, for example, intends to become the world’s leading power in artificial intelligence in the next decade. As the indispensable forum for transatlantic cooperation on the security-aspects of emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO is determined to stay ahead of the curve.

In recent years, NATO has stepped up its work on emerging and disruptive technologies, including by adopting an implementation strategy to ensure NATO’s edge in seven key disruptive technologies (artificial intelligence, data and computing, autonomy, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology, hypersonic technology, and space). DIANA will enable the Alliance

to adapt and adopt new technologies more quickly, strengthen the industrial base, and bridge innovation gaps, ensuring Allies can continue to work effectively together. (NATO 2030, 2022)

Following NATO initiatives and Russian aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, and working to be a partner in security and defence, the EU needs to become a stronger and more capable global actor in security and defence: both to protect the security of its citizens and to act in crisis situations that affect the EU's values and interests.

In the totally different security environment on 21<sup>st</sup> March 2022, the Council approved the Strategic Compass which is a common strategic vision for the EU's role in security and defence and commit to a set of concrete and wide-ranging objectives to achieve these goals in the coming 5–10 years (till 2030).

Building on a common sense of purpose and responsibility, the Strategic Compass specifies clear targets and milestones in four work strands to:

- Act more quickly and decisively when facing crises;
- Secure our citizens against fast-changing threats;
- Invest in the capabilities and technologies we need;
- Partner with others to achieve common goals.

### **Act**

The EU needs to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary. To that end, the EU will:

- Reinforce its civilian and military CSDP missions and operations by providing them with more robust and flexible mandates, promoting rapid and more flexible decision-making process and ensuring greater financial solidarity, while also promoting close cooperation with European-led ad hoc missions and operations. We will strengthen our civilian CSDP through a new Compact allowing for a faster deployment, also in complex environments;
- Develop an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity that will allow the EU to swiftly deploy up to 5,000 troops into non-permissive environments for different types of crisis;
- Strengthen the EU command and control structures, in particular the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, and increase the readiness and cooperation through enhancing military mobility and regular live exercises, in particular for the Rapid Deployment Capacity.

### **Secure**

The EU needs to enhance its ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect its citizens. To that end, the EU will:

- Boost its intelligence capacities, such as the EU Single Intelligence and Analysis;
- Capacity (SIAC) framework to enhance its situational awareness and strategic foresight;
- Create an EU Hybrid Toolbox that brings together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats. In this context, we will develop a dedicated toolbox to address foreign information manipulation and interference;
- Further develop the EU Cyber Defence Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks; strengthen our actions in the maritime, air and space domains, notably by



expanding the Coordinated Maritime Presences to other areas, starting with the Indo-Pacific, and by developing an EU Space Strategy for security and defence.

### **INVEST**

The EO needs to invest more and better in capabilities and innovative technologies, fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies. To that end, the EU will:

- Spend more and better in defence and improve its capability development and planning to better address operational realities and new threats and challenges;
- Seek common solutions to develop the necessary strategic enablers for its missions and operations, as well as next generation capabilities in all operational domains, such as high-end naval platforms, future combat air systems, space-based capabilities and main battle tanks;
- Make full use of Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund to jointly develop cutting-edge military capabilities and invest in technological innovation for defence and create a new Defence Innovation Hub within the European Defence Agency.

### **Partner**

The EU needs to strengthen its cooperation with partners to address common threats and challenges. To that end, the EU will:

- Reinforce strategic partnerships with NATO and the UN through more structured political dialogues as well as operational and thematic cooperation. The EU will also increase its cooperation with regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN;
- Boost cooperation with bilateral partners that share the same values and interests such as United States, Norway, Canada, UK and Japan. Develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, its eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America;
- Develop an EU Security and Defence Partnership Forum to work more closely and effectively with partners to address common challenges.

This is why this Strategic Compass sets out an ambitious but achievable plan to strengthen our security and defence policy by 2030. The case for a new impetus on EU security and defence is compelling: a more hostile environment and wider geopolitical trends call for the EU to shoulder a greater share of responsibility for its own security. (A Strategic, 2022)

At the same critical time for the security and for international peace and stability, on 29 June 2022 the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Allies have endorsed a new Strategic Concept to ensure the Alliance remains fit and resourced for the future.

The new NATO Strategic Concept recognized the European Union as a unique and essential partner for NATO. According to the document NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. On the basis of their longstanding cooperation, the Alliance will enhance the NATO-EU strategic partnership, strengthen political consultations and increase cooperation on issues of common interest, such as military mobility, resilience, the impact of climate change on security, emerging and disruptive technologies, human security, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as well as countering cyber

and hybrid threats and addressing the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.

It is underlined that for the development of the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential. NATO recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. Initiatives to increase defence spending and develop coherent, mutually reinforcing capabilities, while avoiding unnecessary duplications, are key to our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. (NATO, 2022)

About three months after the new NATO Strategic Concept American President Biden published a new National Security Strategy of the USA (12<sup>th</sup> October, 2022). It is in the time when the post-Cold War era is definitely over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next. The new Strategy recognizes that Europe has been, and will continue to be, US foundational partner in addressing the full range of global challenges. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, the US is broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond-strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with its European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins their security, prosperity, and values.

In the Strategy, it is also underlined that the US will count on its Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending, capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring the shared security at this time of intensifying competition. (National Security Strategy, 2022)

Concerning the Strategic Airlift, it is recognized that EU military ambitions are dependent on adequate strategic airlift, and this remains a notable capability gap. Fourteen member states signed the European Air Transport Fleet letter of intent in 2009 although, a decade on, progress remains modest.

Strategic and outsize airlift has long been an issue for European NATO nations, with a reliance on the United States to provide almost all this capacity. The United Kingdom's acquisition of the Boeing C-17 and latterly the introduction of the Airbus A400M have helped to address this.

In the beging of 3rd decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there are only four European states that nationally operate strategic-airlift aircraft: France, Germany, Spain and the UK. The first three field the A400M, while the latter operates the A400M and the C-17. The UK's fleet is of particular note in the context of the European Union, but after the UK has left the EU, the EU heavy transport aircraft total was reduced by around a third.

With the Strategic Airlift Capability – one of a number of existing NATO and European pooled airlift programmes, the EU has launched an effort to develop a new strategic airlifter to fill a critical capability shortfall, but this is one serial initiative.

## **CONCLUSION**

In the timespan of more than two decades, the EU has started many initiatives and undertaken steps in order to develop European Military Capabilities.

The idea of the EU to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, was launched at the Helsinki European Council in 1999.

To overcome the existing shortfalls in the EU military capabilities, the Council launched the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) in 2001.

It was followed by a Military Capability Commitment Conference and an EU Force Catalogue. In 2005 Strategic lift capabilities were identified as a key capability gap and one of the capability improvement priorities, for which the implementation of various multinational initiatives were planned. Nevertheless, nowadays there are only four European states that nationally operate strategic-airlift aircraft.

Having the Military Rapid Response Concept, followed by a Maritime Rapid Response Concept and an Air Rapid Response Concept, the Capability Development Plan (CDP) was drawn up in 2008 trying to once again prioritise the shortfalls in the EU military capabilities.

The 2018 Capability Development Plan (CDP) was followed by 11 new EU Capability Development Priorities and the EU Requirements Catalogue in 2019.

In 2022 an EU Strategic Compass, a new NATO Strategic Concept and a new US National Security Strategy were adopted. All these documents underline the importance of the EU and its military capabilities to address the full range of global challenges.

Nevertheless, all these activities, the main Allied operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century like those in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. have clearly demonstrated that many European NATO nations still have relatively limited capabilities for the rapid deployment of significant forces outside national territory and for extended sustainment of operations far from home bases.

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## **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>The Headline Goal 2010 was adopted in 2004

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## **НЕДОСТАТЪЦИ ВЪВ ВОЕННИТЕ СПОСОБНОСТИ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКИТЕ СТРАНИ - ЧЛЕНКИ НА НАТО, В КРАЯ НА ХХ И НАЧАЛОТО НА ХХІ ВЕК**

***Резюме:** Статията изследва еволюцията на плановете на Европейския съюз за изграждане на ключови военни способности, които да позволят на Съюза да провежда независимо и ефективно бъдещи многонационални операции. Анализът на поредицата от инициативи, планове и концепции показва, че съществуващите недостатъци все още не са преодолен и все още има сериозни недостатъци във военните способности на Европейския съюз.*

***Ключови думи:** възможности, недостатъци, оперативна съвместимост, концепция, инициативи*

**Assoc. Prof. Plamen Bogdanov, PhD**

University of Library Studies and Information Technologies

E-mail: [p.bogdanov@unibit.bg](mailto:p.bogdanov@unibit.bg)

**Sen. Assist. Prof. Ralitsa Yotova, PhD**

University of Library Studies and Information Technologies

E-mail: [r.yotova@unibit.bg](mailto:r.yotova@unibit.bg)

**Sen. Assist. Prof. Steliana Yordanova, PhD**

University of Library Studies and Information Technologies

E-mail: [s.yordanova@unibit.bg](mailto:s.yordanova@unibit.bg)